Editor’s note: This commentary is by Terence Cuneo, of Williston, a professor of philosophy at the University of Vermont.
[O]n July 28, the Hinesburg Select Board voted to allow Vermont Gas Systems (VGS) to seize by eminent domain a portion of Geprags Park, the town’s only public park. VGS wishes to seize this land so that it can run its fracked gas line through this section of the park. I was present at the meeting in which this decision was made. The selectboard made the morally wrong decision.
The land in question was given by the Geprags sisters to the town so that it be used “only … for public recreational and educational purposes” (description of the property decreed to the town of Hinesburg, January 1992). By accepting this gift, the town entered into a “covenant real” with the Geprags sisters, according to which the town promised to care for and maintain the park. By permitting a portion of the park to be taken by eminent domain, the selectboard has broken this covenant. That is why they acted wrongly.
Think of things this way. Suppose you are on your deathbed and are concerned about your dog Fido. You say, “Promise me that you’ll see to it that Fido is cared for.”
Let’s say I agree. If I then sell Fido to some third party who legally binds herself to caring for Fido, I haven’t violated my promise to you.
But suppose you say, “Promise me that you’ll take care of Fido.”
Let’s say I agree. But if I then sell Fido to some third party who legally binds herself to caring for Fido, I have violated my promise to you.
We depend on our elected officials to think clearly through the ethical issues and do the right thing. When they do not, we rightly lose confidence in them.
The key question is whether the sale or ceding of (any portion of) Geprags Park is like the first or the second scenario. There are compelling reasons to believe it’s like the second scenario.
First, notice that if the situation were like the first scenario, then it would be morally permissible for the board to sell the entire park to the highest bidder so both could make a lot of money. (Of course there would have to be an agreement that the land continue to be used for recreation and education alone.) That should strike us as both outrageous and morally troubling.
Second, the deed to which the town agreed explicitly states that it “runs with the land in perpetuity” and that “the Town of Hinesburg shall properly care for and maintain the property decreed thereby.” This makes it clear that the town’s covenant with the Geprags sisters is like the second scenario.
Hinesburg, then, broke its promise: It said it would care for Geprags Park and now it has allowed a private company to take part of the park for a sum of money. It’s as if the town promised to care for the Geprags sisters’ own dog and then, in return for a sum of money, gave the dog away to someone else to care for it.
But perhaps the situation isn’t so simple. Imagine that selling or ceding (a portion of) the park were claimed to be for the “public good” as defined by some quasi-judicial body, such as the Public Service Board (PSB). Would that morally justify selling or ceding (a portion) of the park?
It would not. Suppose the PSB were right that selling or ceding (a portion of) the park is for the public good. Then, admittedly, there would be something to be said for selling or ceding the land. But it would not morally permit the town to sell or cede (any portion of) the land. For the public good needn’t trump the ethical requirements of the covenant.
To see why, return to the deathbed analogy: Suppose I promise to care for Fido but learn that selling the dog would be for the public good. (Imagine the dog is worth a lot of money, which the state could use to fix route 2A!) That would not morally permit me to sell the dog.
Now suppose the PSB were wrong: selling or ceding (any portion) of the park wouldn’t be for the public good. Then there is no moral permission to sell or cede (any portion of) the land.
Here is the conclusion that we should draw. Unless it’s an emergency, the town of Hinesburg is not ethically permitted to sell or cede (any portion of) Geprags Park because it’s not permitted to violate the covenant into which it entered. The town is not in fact faced with an emergency. So, it is morally impermissible for it to sell or cede (any portion of) the park. Furthermore, even it were true that running a fracked gas pipeline through Vermont is for the public good, then that still wouldn’t morally permit the town to sell or cede (any portion of) the park. Of course if running such a gas line through Vermont isn’t genuinely for the public good, then the town isn’t morally permitted to sell or cede (any portion of) the park. Either way, it’s not morally okay to act as the selectboard did.
We depend on our elected officials to think clearly through the ethical issues and do the right thing. When they do not, we rightly lose confidence in them. Many of us have lost faith in the town’s selectboard because they neither thought through the issues clearly nor did the right thing (although some of its members did). It’s our duty as citizens not to treat this decision as if it doesn’t matter. It does matter. It matters that we not make yet another sacrifice of what is ethically right on the altar of profit.
