Editor’s note: This commentary is by Bram Towbin, who is a member of the Plainfield Hazard Mitigation Committee.
[N]ovember’s windstorm in central Vermont that caused widespread power outages prompted Mary Powell, the president and CEO of Green Mountain Power, to address resiliency issues on VPR: Utilities need to “do every darn thing we can in the meantime to prepare for these events make sure we have the resources, the training …”
Unfortunately the rhetoric is at odds with actual policy at Molly’s Falls Dam, which is located upstream from our village near the town of Marshfield. GMP owns this earthen structure, constructed in the 1920s, and generates a small amount of electricity via a large pipe called a penstock which connects to a power station offsite. In the last few years the company has made upgrades to these facilities but has ignored the dam itself, specifically the gates and emergency spillways. This was brought to my attention in 2016 by town residents Michael Billingsley and Dan Gadd.
According to GMP’s own reports, a failure would result in a 500-year flood event, such as the kind that recently struck Houston. Vermont Agency of Natural Resource flood maps, which show the much less devastating 100-year events, point to direct hits to Marshfield and Plainfield.
In 2016 I examined the spillways, which are the structures that relieve pressure during a heavy rain event. The exposed rebar and soil erosion was troubling. What was even more disconcerting was hearing the game plan for managing the release of the water. In the event of an emergency, two GMP workers, who must travel miles to the area, plan to walk out on to the dam and unlock a hydraulic jack from a onsite locker and manually jack up the pistons on either side of the spillway. Since there are separate channels, this involves crossing two walkways, which are placed over the area where the water would be raging. One doesn’t need to be a safety engineer to imagine the inadequacies of this arrangement in the middle of a tempest. In fact, a 2011 event exposed additional shortcomings.
In May 2011, prior to Tropical Storm Irene, our area was hit with a severe localized rainstorm. This forced an evacuation of residents of Plainfield Village to the firehouse. Our first responders sounded the alarm as a separate body of water in our town was taking out roads and threatening houses. There were no evacuations in Marshfield. The dam weathered the event, allowing no formal notification to regulatory authorities.
Unfortunately that night was far from business as usual. The GMP people on scene were unable to use their cellphones as the dam was located in a reception “dead zone.” There was no lighting. There are reports that there were issues in trying to deploy the hydraulic jacks. Evacuees in the Plainfield fire station heard very nervous radio exchanges between the first responders in our town and their counterparts in Marshfield. They were called to the scene, suggesting GMP was overwhelmed. It should be noted that the penstock, which is the first line of defense in relieving water pressure, was under repair, which added to the buildup of water. It begs the question of why there was no — even minor — refurbishments to the spillways as they were going to be the only drainage option for the excess rain.
GMP plays down this event, noting that a cell tower and lighting have been added since that time. Furthermore, they monitor the water levels, and their readings showed no cause for concern. During the last major storm, the one which prompted Ms. Powell’s VPR appearance, Plainfield’s Emergency Management director confirmed that there was a power outage at the dam. This is disturbing as not only would responders face the same isolation and darkness as the first event, but it means that GMP was unable to remotely track the situation. It begs the question: Why is a power company unable to provide emergency backup power to a fragile piece of infrastructure?
Representatives of both Marshfield and Plainfield have met with GMP officials and found them to be professional, courteous and eager to defend the status quo. There have been at least four formal get-togethers. At our last meeting the public was assured by half a dozen GMP officials and contracted experts, that the dam met statutory requirements and was deemed safe. There were detailed explanations about improvements and vague assurances of refitting the spillways.
Requests for monetary support to our towns’ volunteer first responders, some of whom were on top of GMP’s dam assisting GMP workers, were met with a categorical “no.” Remember, the existence of the dam infrastructure places an unusual burden on our towns’ first responders. Presently the mechanism for funding lies on property tax revenue. Ironically, since the bulk of the dam lies across the line in the town of Cabot, Marshfield is not currently being fully compensated for the area it covers. In addition Plainfield receives no GMP support.
Does the company have the money? Their compensation regimes suggest yes. Mary Powell’s salary exponentially exceeds the combined pay of all the employees in Plainfield and Marshfield. GMP’s lawyers, engineers and public relations folks, who meet with town officials, earn more than any municipal worker. No doubt these hardworking professionals are worth their pay. The question is, in light of GMP’s documented expenditures, why are meager town tax revenues subsidizing GMP shareholders? Why does GMP force citizens to shoulder a safety burden due to their decision to underinvest in safety?
A well-funded, for-profit utility can present a very convincing argument that crumbling spillways and manual gates are of no concern as they are within the rubric of official government-sanctioned safety guidelines. This also happens to saves them millions of dollars. They spent money on the revenue-producing power production components (penstock to the power station) but not first line safety measures (modern gates and spillways.) This begs the public policy question: Should these decisions be left to the dam owner, considering their interests do not and cannot align with public safety?
We are just past the one year anniversary of California’s Oroville Dam disaster which forced the evacuation of 200,000. Emergency planners were left flat-footed as the spillways collapsed and 50-year-old never-used emergency channels weren’t prepared for service. This event seems to have had no effect on GMP as the spillways I viewed in 2016 are still in disrepair. Nothing has been done. We have been fortunate that the dam has held during the unprecedented number of serious storms in 2011, 2015 and 2017. Luck, however, should not be the basis of policy. The risk calculus must be reassessed placing first line employees, first responders and residents as the primary driver of spending.
Here are much needed reforms:
• The state, not the utility, should directly manage an annual inspection process.
• Liability must clearly rest with utility, not the town. This must be codified into law.
• Clear deadlines, with clear financial penalties for non-compliance, must be established for the installation of remotely operated gates, onsite emergency power backup systems and refurbished spillways.
• Monetary support for local first responders to design warning systems and evacuation routes.
This problem will be on the doorstep of the governor, the Senate and the House, one way or another. If a breach occurs, the wall of water will pummel Marshfield, erode Route 2, sweep through the Twinfield Union School, hit Plainfield village and eventually land in Montpelier. No one would want to face a discussion about antiquated safety protocols among a trail of casualties, wrecked homes and destroyed businesses. To paraphrase Ms. Powell, utilities need to do every darn thing they can in the meantime to prepare for these events and make sure everyone has the resources and the training.
